An unexpected contact on LinkedIn. A proposal of employment from a headhunter, probably a female agent, operating from the Asian nation. The opportunity to make around £20,000 on the side writing a handful of geopolitical analyses for a Chinese company containing confidential or “insider” information. Payment in digital currency or physical money preferred.
It might appear obvious, in this scenario, that something about this approach would be amiss. However, China’s influential Ministry of State Security still considers it worthwhile to deploy headhunters to attempt this – prompting the domestic spy agency to issue multiple warnings about their operations online.
Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
In 2023, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum said Chinese agents were contacting Britons on the platform on an extraordinary scale, at a rate of ten thousand over the previous two and a half years, attempting to obtain political, industrial, military and scientific secrets. But a fresh campaign targeting elected officials and parliament has prompted the spy agency to act again.
A spying warning was issued on this week via the administrative teams of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords equivalent: a single slide after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to contact MPs, lords, their assistants, economic experts, research organizations – anybody who might become a source.
Intelligence Approach and Legal Updates
In the typical style of British intelligence, there was no publication of the protective guidance from MI5 or the Home Office. But the agency was aware its advisory document would leak once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Republishing it in the press assists the general population more easily recognize interactions with a fraudulent intent.
This warning has the effect of flushing out additional details from in and around Westminster, although that is not MI5’s main objective. The agency aims for public figures to understand that just because exchanges on LinkedIn are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are completely safe.
Nor is domestic spy agency understood to have been reacting to any specific incident in parliament, though the recent actions does come after the embarrassing failure of the legal case of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his associate Christopher Berry on a legal detail earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been charged of spying for the foreign power – a charge they denied – but inability to successfully conclude a prosecution under the since replaced Official Secrets Act resulted in concerns that British democracy had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Legislation and China's Long-Term Interests
The law has since been updated, and the security briefing contains a note of its replacement: “Individuals involved in espionage activity risk substantial criminal penalties under the new security law.” It is a criminal offense if somebody engages in conduct that is or is likely to “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious question, however, is what China has to gain. An elected representative who is not a government minister will have limited knowledge of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs even less. Yet Beijing is also interested in the legislative body: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the Britain's China policy on issues such as Huawei or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being influenced by MPs.
Methodological Variations and Persistent Digital Threats
To a degree there are cultural differences too. Authoritarian governments like China’s export information gathering techniques and the size of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, employing 300,000 individuals. A former US official, a US national cyber director under president Joe Biden, commented it was occasionally assessed that “China have more English speakers engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is willing to cultivate people over the extended period and sometimes even the agencies have struggled to distinguish between legitimate relationships and espionage. “Beijing has a low threshold for what information is considered to be of value,” security minister a government official told parliamentarians on this week, but a sudden turn in the government situation may mean an individual quickly peripheral turning important.
An alternative perspective to consider the relentless activities at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the international competition between China and the west at a level under the level of outright war. The nation has stepped up its cyber operations, with the Salt Typhoon infiltration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of countless connected equipment.
Chinese authorities is engaged in persistent attempts to identify covert sources on British democracy online because it seeks to be challenging, to display power and because it has the capability.